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The organization (Ângkar) as a state of exception: the case of the S-21 extermination camp, Phnom Penh

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Introduction

In this paper we focus on the case of S-21, terra incognita for organization theory. Our goal is to deal with an organization dedicated to genocide, choosing as our case something relatively neglected in the broader social science and non-specialist literature in comparison to the Third Reich. The purpose of this work is to investigate how such organization was structured, especially from a spatial and relational point of view, in order to excavate the meanings, the Kafkaesque paradoxes, and rationalities, making such organization possible.

S-21, (now the Tuol Sleng memorial), has been variously described during and after the Cambodian Khmer Rouge regime as a ministry, office, or prison, but this centre was devoted fundamentally to extermination rather than to other functions performed in concentration camps, such as incarceration, re-education or forced labour. In this site of death, located in the city of Phnom Penh, thousands of people were killed between 1975 and 1979. The number of victims is not clear, despite the minutiae of the administrative work that took place in the camp. Some sources refer to 14,000, others to 17,000, others to 20,000 (see respectively Hawk 1986, Chandler 2000, Timesonline 2009).

Keywords: total institutions; evil organizations; Cambodia; Khmer Rouge; S-21; Kafkaesque organizing; state of exception; bios; zoe; bare life

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By taking a close look at the case of S-21, we respond to Clegg’s (2006) call for greater attention to total institutions and use this organizational type to learn about the most negative and extreme consequences of organization. Given the use of bureaucratic means to confuse, intimidate, harm and destroy their members, and the peculiar socio-spatial patterns of this camp, we explore S-21 through Agamben’s philosophical work on the ‘state of exception’ and the production of bare (or naked) life. We used Agamben’s work, which is barely integrated into analysis of power relations in organizational studies (see ‘Exception and organization’ section), as a methodological framework that allowed us to unravel the spatial and semantic organization of this camp. Moreover, this framework provides a basis for situating our work in a wider debate that spans anthropology (Caton 2006), cultural studies (Diken and Lausten 2005), politics (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008) and human geography (Minca 2006). In each of these disciplines Agamben’s works is increasingly used to frame discussions of the nature of both past and contemporary camps and the biopolitical power(s) that sustains them.

We divide the paper into five sections. In the first, we discuss the contextual conditions of this camp. Our contextualization will focus mainly on two aspects: the vision which the Khmer Rouge had for Cambodian society when they led it between 1975 and 1979, and the importance of a three-tier structure of murder (Hawk 1986) for implementing this vision (at the apex of the topmost tier, was S-21). In the second section we introduce Agamben’s methodological framework, while in the third we use it to explore S-21. In the fourth section we present the findings of our qualitative analysis (based on semiotic clustering) and discuss them. The outcomes of this analysis lead to the following section, where we read the S-21 as a Kafkaesque biopolitical machine.

K for Kambodia

In the spring of 1975, the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmers, in opposition to the right wing, Khmer Bleu, or Blue Khmers; Saunders 2008) won a five-year civil war against the US-backed Khmer republic led by the self-proclaimed Marshall Lon Nol, which had been in power since the 1970 coup d’état against the People’s Socialist Community of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, established in 1955. In their effort to construct a radical Marxist-Leninist state of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), inspired in part by Maoist thinking, the Khmer Rouge initiated a number of deep social changes. The vision of the Khmer Rouge leaders was one of pure socialism, the creation of a society with no traces of feudalism, capitalism or any other exploitative forms of social organization. The vision presented some traits of primitive communism, given the absence of a well-developed class structure and the idea of returning to a form of society in which the forces of production would not generate the surplus necessary to support a non-labouring class (Adler 2009).

At the core of the Khmer state sat the ‘Party Center’, composed of a very small group of the tiny Cambodian elite that had been educated in Marxism-Leninism in Paris, as well as influenced by the Communist Party of Indochina. The embrace of Marxism was entirely pragmatic, not theoretical. Cambodians wanted rid of a French colonialism that maintained a feudal society almost entirely untransformed; thus, any Khmer revolution would have to be based on the peasantry. The Khmer Rouge sought to emulate Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution in a ‘super great leap forward’: after gaining command of the state, cities were
evacuated, schools closed, factories deserted, monasteries emptied, libraries burnt, money and wages abolished, and the freedom to speak out, organize, meet, and eat privately, all denied. All life was to be collectivized – even weddings and partner selection. In such a situation, in which civil society was virtually denied, the state became everything (Widyono 2007).

The Party Center was the key node of the state at the middle of which was Saloth Sâr (1925–1998), a former schoolteacher who adopted the pseudonym of Pol Pot, the best known in a sequence of aliases including Pouk, Hay Pol, Grand Uncle, Elder Brother and First Brother. Pol Pot had attended secondary school in French Colonial Cambodia during the semi-fascist Vichy period and was exposed to Petai-nist ideology with its stress on the need for a dominant national leader, its bias against cosmopolitan cities, and its fascist cult of violence, some of whose ideas seemed to have influenced him.

Pol Pot has been described as ‘elusive, a shadowy figure with a smiling face and a quiet manner, whose trajectory to tyranny remains something of a mystery’ (Kellerman 2004). Under his leadership, the Khmer Rouge caused the death of perhaps as many as 1.5–2 million people, due to malnutrition, overwork, disease and extermination. The Khmer vision implied the elimination, in the first place, of all those class enemies theoretically against the revolution. Later, when the agricultural paradise of abundance showed signs of failure, and established quotas, three to six times pre-war rice yields (Hawk 1986), were not reached, the responsibility was seen to be due to counterrevolutionary activities; thus, by the end of the Khmer Rouge regime it was not only ‘classical’ enemies that were fed into the extermination machine but also those peasants in whose name the revolution was justified (Hawk 1986).

The Khmer Rouge seized power in Year Zero according to their calendar, establishing a baseline for a total new beginning from which the old was to be eliminated and a new society built. Literally, such social construction meant the annihilation of people unfit for the new society. There were a number of rationales for annihilation. At the most basic level people died because of starvation, exhaustion (from forced marches and forced labour), and disease (modern medicine was reserved for the army and the Khmer Rouge cadres). Secondly, massacres were conducted against groups labelled as enemies of the revolution. Racial, religious or ethnic reasons, as well as economic, social or political ones, were invoked. Extra-judicial mass execution was normal. Thirdly, there was a nation-wide judicially sanctioned extermination system, organized around provincial prisons operated at the local level. As the central extermination centre, S-21 was the apex of this execution system. Only seven people survived this site. When Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge fled Phnom Penh, the final victims of S-21 were killed prior to departure.

S-21/Tuol Sleng was a place of horror in a genocidal process, the heart of darkness of DK. In what follows we wish to concentrate on the organization that made this horror possible, introducing our methodological approach, mainly based around the work of Giorgio Agamben, whom we use to interpret S-21.

**Exception and organization**

Scholars of power and organization relations have rarely used the work of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. There are two explicit attempts that make use of Agamben’s thought in the work of Letiche (2005) and Beverungen and Dunne
(2007) but their focus is on very specific (and relatively minor) sides of Agamben’s philosophy (i.e. on melancholy and on Agamben’s interpretation of Bartleby, from the notorious Herman Melville short story about the scrivener) and cannot be considered a full engagement with his ideas. Other authors have occasionally referred to Agamben (Fleming 2006, Rehn and O’Doherty 2007, Stavrakakis 2008, Cunha et al. 2010, Jackson and Carter 2010) but above all it is only Banerjee (2008), Gray (2008), Murtola (2010) and Tedmanson and Wadiwel (2010), that have fully taken into account Agamben’s main focus on the sacralization of life, its profanation and the nature of the (concentration) camp as a ‘state of exception’ (especially in Murtola (2010) and Banerjee’s (2008) work). Agamben remains at present a relatively underdeveloped figure in the realm of organization studies, despite his relevance in recent years in disciplines such as Political Studies, Sociology and Human Geography (for an introduction, Ek 2006).

Agamben’s thought stimulates some relevant questions in relation to the organization of places such as refugee camps, concentration and exterminations camps, and the biopolitical rationalities that govern many other spaces in contemporary urban settings. One key question posed by Agamben is ‘What is a camp? What is its political-juridical structure? How could such events have taken place there?’ (Agamben 2000, p. 36, italics added). The relevance of this question, from an organizational point of view, relies on the italicized how. Agamben is not suggesting that we interrogate the moral and political reasons of the people that commit atrocious horrors against other human beings. Rather,

it would be more honest […] to investigate carefully how – that is, thanks to what juridical procedures and political devices human beings could have been so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives to the point that committing any act toward them would no longer appear as a crime. (Agamben 2000, p. 40)

In other words, Agamben is asking: through what organizational patterns are death and other concentration camps possible?

While it is not our intention, and it would not be appropriate in the context of this argument, to offer an overview of Agamben’s work (see instead Mills 2008, Durantaye 2009) we will offer a short introduction to two concepts that may provide a methodological basis to answer the above questions. The first concept is that of Homo Sacer, or sacred man; while the second concerns what he terms the ‘state of exception’.

Homo Sacer is a figure of old Roman law: essentially he/she is a person banned from society, one that could be killed by anybody but may not be sacrificed (Agamben 1998, p. 33). The relevance of this figure, the Homo Sacer, resides in the fact that the law does not apply to him/her (because everybody could kill him/her) but at the same time he/she still is under the law: because it is the law itself that defines what a Homo Sacer is, and what it is that people can do to a person holding such a status.

The core of Agamben’s thought about Homo Sacer resides in the distinction between the bios (the political value of someone) and the zoe (his/her ‘bare’ or ‘naked’ life). Roughly speaking, the role of law from the very beginning has been to divide bios and zoe, in order to concentrate and control the former by means of the latter (an idea which Agamben derives from Aristotle’s distinction between zen/ eu zen, and which positions Agamben in opposition to Foucault, who sees the rise
of biopolitics – hence of this particular need for control – only in the modern era). Agamben proposes that law and politics are related to the political status of someone (bios) rather than to the bare life (zoe) of individuals: for instance, law cares about the citizenship status of a person, rather than his or her weight. However, in order to achieve the control of bios, laws must control bare life (zoe) as well. The Homo Sacer is the perfect exemplification of this biopolitical mechanism in which the law controls the Homo Sacer thanks to the exclusion of his/her body (zoe) from the law: this is what Agamben terms inclusion by means of exclusion (Agamben 1998).

The paradoxical biopolitical machinery becomes clearer when we confront Agamben’s second relevant concept: the ‘state of exception’. Relying on Carl Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty, Agamben argues that only the sovereign can suspend law (creating an exception to the law) while remaining within the law itself (since the law is represented by the sovereign). In this sense, ‘The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception. The particular “force” of law consists in this capacity of law to maintain itself in relation to an exteriority’ (Diken and Lausten 2006, p. 447).

The camp (whether a concentration or extermination camp) is the clearest form of the ‘state of exception’ as it appears ‘as the legal form of what cannot have legal form’ (Agamben 1999, Agamben 2005, p. 1). In the extermination camp the law is suspended but the camp itself is held within the law precisely by means of its exclusion: everything is possible in there because the law is suspended by the sovereign power that, in the end (as party, leader or whatever), is the law itself. Using this biopolitical technique Agamben shows us the meaning of the camp in relation to the homines sacri that populate it. Banning the zoe of individual from the society, (hence controlling it in a particular space, the camp), the authors of the state of exception are able to control the individual’s bios too. And they can do whatever they want, because an exception is created, and within it everything is theoretically and practically possible. Our argument is that S-21 can be understood through this approach because, in its perimeters, the bare life of the individuals in its grasp is controlled and their political values stripped away. As Agamben pointed out, writing about the Jews and Gypsies in Nazi camps, ‘their rights are no longer the rights of the citizen, that is when human beings are truly sacred’. Instead, in the sense of Roman law of the archaic period, they are ‘doomed to death’ (Agamben 2000, p. 20).

The S-21 as a state of exception
Kang Khiek Ieu (also knew as ‘Duch’) was the person who oversaw the interrogation and cudgelling to death of some 17,000 Cambodian in the S-21 camp. Interviewed by an English journalist, he declared:

I and everyone else who worked in that place knew that anyone who entered had to be psychologically demolished, eliminated by steady work, given no way out. No answer could avoid death. Nobody who came to us had any chance of saving himself. (Pellizzari 2008)

‘That place’, the camp as spatial locus, is hence the first thing that need to be investigated (see Image 1).
People were forcibly brought into S-21: once there, nobody was free to leave, and the medium through which the ‘sacralization’ of the Cambodians imprisoned therein took place was that of its spatial structure. The camp was spatially organized to physically control the inmates:

The classrooms were transformed into cells with the windows solidly barred. All the cells in the basement and on the first floor of the four buildings had been turned into small individual compartments 2 meters long and 1 meter wide. In each cell there were 18 such compartments. (De Nike et al. 2000, p. 372)

In this spatial *locus* rules and routines were implemented (see Image 2). The camp-as-state-of-exception enacted control of the political (and moral) value of the prisoner through the control of their physical routine:

Every morning, around 4:30, they had to take off their underwear to be searched by one group. After the search, there was a half hour of gymnastic exercise, but of course with one foot attached. [...] While in bed, if someone wanted to change position, he had to obtain permission from a guard. (De Nike et al. 374)

The most important rules related to torture. The following quotes (taken from the documentary *S-21: The Khmer Rouge Killing Machine* by Panh 2003) are the words of a former S-21 torturer. The first quote shows how vital was the connection between the bare life of the tortured individual and its (mostly fictive) political value: ‘Before torture, it is necessary to examine its health. Never proceed in hassle. If he dies, we lose the document’ (Panh 2003, 00:36:12.840 → 00:36:24.312). The second quote reinforces this vision: ‘Torture was something cold and cruel. I didn’t think. I was arrogant. I had power over the enemy. I never thought of his life. I
saw him as an animal’ (Panh 2003, 00:37:40,040 → 00:37:59,514). The biopolitical power at work in S-21 is, perhaps, best captured in the following quote: ‘Each man has his own memory, each his own history. The aim was to break down their entire memory and make an act of treason out of it’ (Panh 2003, 01:08:07, 160 → 01:08:26,51). Torture was indeed the aberrant organizational tool used to achieve the control of bios (the production of true or fake information on betrayers, conspiracies or other political activities) through the annihilation of zoe.

At its maximum power, the exception created in the S-21 camp changed the values of things such as life and death, achieving complete control over the

Image 2. ‘Security’ regulations of the camp.

Image 3. Vann Nath’s ‘Mother and Child of the Genocide’ One of the last paintings from his genocide period (ca. 1980).
*homines sacri* contained: they could be killed by anyone, without punishment or offence being incurred. Death was a normal companion for the inmates. As the painter Vann Nath, one of the few survivors of S-21 (who passed away in 2011) once said: ‘We ate our meals next to dead bodies, and we didn’t care because we were like animals’ (BBC 2009) (see Image 3). In this sense S-21 ‘took away the individual’s own death, proving that henceforth nothing belonged to him and he belonged to no one. His death merely set a seal on the fact that he had never existed’ (Arendt, 1968, p. 451).

From what we have just presented it seems clear that ‘the state of exception that allows for the exercise of sovereign power […] finds its most potent expression when it becomes spatialized’ (Minca 2005, p. 409). S-21, with spatial structures and rules creating a killing machine working as a state of exception: controlling and eliminating life. Having said this, it seems to us that something is still missing. The real challenge is, indeed, not only to understand S-21’s organizational structure as a state of exception but also to question how S-21 came into being: through what kind of organizational patterns was this exceptional machine constituted?

**Paradoxes as organizational machines**

In order to investigate the nature of the S-21 as a state of exception we decided to explore some of the available material about the life in the camp. As our data source, we used David Chandler’s book on S-21, *Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison*. We chose this book for several reasons. First, it is a major work totally dedicated to the case of S-21. It is a detailed investigation, heavily researched and resulting from interviews with participants of various sorts, and extensive archival work in Tuol Sleng. Second, this author, David Chandler, is a major Cambodia expert, ‘the doyen of Western historians of Cambodia’ (Short 2004, p. 290). Third, major authors on Cambodia’s DK regime and Cambodian authors on S-21 cite this book (e.g. Meng-Try and Sorya 2001, Short 2004, Hinton 2005). These reasons give us confidence that this is credible source to study S-21. Other authors (e.g. Weick 1993) have also used books as data sources, a choice that seems appropriate when direct access is not possible, which for obvious reasons is the case, and the extremity of the case renders it valuable for analysis even if based on secondary data sources.

To this book we applied semiotic clustering analysis (Feldman 1995). Semiotic clustering has been described as a simple but powerful technique that allows researchers to uncover successive layers of meaning, from surface signs to an underlying structure (Manning 1987, Clark et al. 2010). In this clustering, data are usually organized into a table with three columns. The first column refers to direct textual evidence. It includes the main ways in which informants have approached the concept of interest. The second column, connotative meanings, identifies a pattern underlying the denotative meanings and builds new meaning through some type of thematic association. There is not a ‘right’ way of filling in this column, since meanings are dependent upon interpretation and emerge from data. The last column involves an interpretation effort similar to the transposition of data from the first to the second column, synthesizing data in a deep structure. This deep structure should be viewed as plausible. Plausibility is ultimately, however, always a personal, albeit rigorously informed, interpretation (Manning and Cullum-Swan 1994).
Our interpretations should be viewed as plausible but they may diverge from others (Van Maanen 1988). This final column thus includes the root causes and suggests a deep structure underlying the data.³

Figure 1 presents the data structure, depicting on the right the three dimensions that resulted from the analysis.⁴ These dimensions are understood here as paradoxes. The sensemaking paradox,⁵ as we interpreted it, refers to the politics of understanding. It aimed to answer the question ‘How shall one interpret the world?’ The Manichean world paradox refers to the diffusion of ideology: how the world should be. It contains messages about ideals and divides society into the pure and the diseased. The agency paradox refers to the logics of identity: who am I as an individual in this new world: a free citizen or a captive subject? The separation we
make is therefore a necessary simplification. Our readers are invited to acknowledge
the interaction and overlap between themes.

Table 1 provides representative illustrations of data from which second-order
themes emerged. In parentheses we indicate the page number of each quote in
Chandler’s book.

**Paradox of sensemaking**

An overarching dimension emerging from the data is captured in what we
described as the paradox of sensemaking. Sensemaking attempts feature saliently,
although by other names, in Chandler’s discussion. We describe the organization
as paradoxical in terms of sensemaking because two antagonistic forces are at
play: sensegiving efforts by Ângkar (the Khmer Rouge organization) coupled with
attempts to block sensemaking in practice. A potent ideology tries to influence
the way people construct meaning about the regime in general and about the role of
S-21 in the context of DK. The tension is paradoxical in the sense that more
sensegiving was disrupted with more senseblocking. In other words, collective
sense was given and taken by the same organization. Sensegiving was actually
interrupted when individual attempts at sensemaking were neutralized by the local
rules.

**Sensegiving**

Sensegiving refers to the process by which some agent aims to influence the way
people define reality (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991). In the case of S-21 in general
and DK in particular, indications were clear: only one way of seeing (the official
line) was acceptable. All other ways were not only illegitimate but also very dan-
gerous. An intoxicating ideology was spread, which offered a totalizing view of the
world, not as it was but as it should be. Forced retrospective confirmation was used
to validate ideology and interpretations based in it. Prisoner’s biographies were
altered to the point that they fitted the needs of the Ângkar: ‘the interrogators (...)’
further said that anyone I could think of who had been arrested in any sector or
zone I should say that they were all my connections’ (p. 85).

**Senseblocking**

In parallel with the effort towards collective sensegiving emanating from the Party
centre, there was a permanent local effort to block individual sensemaking, hence
our labelling of this process as senseblocking. We identified several forms of this
blocking that sought to prevent people from making sense of what was happening
around them. First, secrecy was viewed as a necessary instrument for victory. In
addition to secrecy, rules and positions shifted unexpectedly. DK was a very unsta-
ble world in which no-one could have confidence in his or her personal safety.
Because communication was difficult and was viewed with suspicion, making
sense of events was made even more difficult. As a result, one strategy was to
stop trying to make sense. As one guard said ‘I made myself concentrate on work,
work and again work’ (p. 138). Or even more clearly, in DK ‘to survive you
had to do three things: ... know nothing, hear nothing, see nothing’ (Kiernan
Table 1. Representative data for each second order theme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second order themes</th>
<th>Representative first order evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (a) Sensegiving     | • One hand is for production, the other for beating the enemy (41)  
   | • The enemies can’t grasp our intentions (80)  
   | • The war could be won easily if every Khmer combatant killed thirty Vietnamese (71)  
   | • It is a small matter to beat someone to death, but it is very important to conduct revolution, to uproot resistance, to preserve redness (138)  
   | • The guards’ mission: ‘protecting the revolution’ (153) |
| (b) Senseblocking    | • ‘You never know if you are correct’ [a guard] (27)  
   | • We were all spying on each another (87)  
   | • People were insecure psychologically. People feared being wrongly unconsciously (87)  
   | • If the higher-ups keep modifying things back and forth suddenly like this, those lower down will be unable to keep up (85)  
   | • I made myself concentrate on work, work and again work (138)  
   | • Cutting prisoners off from any sense of community or self-respect (121)  
   | • They were urged to use torture and propaganda in ‘proper’ proportions that were not made clear (86)  
   | • You never know if you are ‘correct’ (27)  
   | • Only through secrecy can we be masters of the situation and win victory over the enemy who cannot find out who is who (16) |
| (c) Purity           | • ‘Life stories must be good and must conform to our requirements’ [Pol Pot] (91)  
   | • A good biography that included a good class background and praiseworthy biographies could lead to Party membership, better work assignments and enhanced personal security (90)  
   | • Interrogators at S-21 had been taught that the Party’s ‘enemies’ were to be ‘smashed’ in ‘storming attacks’. They had also been taught that they were the regime’s ‘life breath’ (129)  
   | • We all carry vestiges of our old-class character, deep-rooted for generations (44)  
   | • Their raw energy, so attractive in its revolutionary potential (34) |
| (d) Disease          | • There is sickness in the party (44)  
   | • Once infected, anyone could infect others (44?)  
   | • [The enemies as] ‘“Germs” (merok)’ (44)  
   | • Prisoners were taken ‘away to the West’ – in Khmer mythology, the direction of death (140)  

(Continued)
The Manichean world paradox

A second overarching dimension emerging from our interpretation is the paradox of the Manichean world. The world of DK was obsessed with the opposites of purity and disease. We call it a paradox because purity was created in the very same way as disease: they were both ‘manufactured’, and purity could easily turn into disease (although not the other way around). The paradox revealed itself in the following form: to affirm its purity, the regime surrounded itself by the impure. The system needed the impure to affirm its purity – and it managed to create them.

Purity

DK leaders saw their country as a paragon of virtue. In fact, the new DK would be an example to the entire world: purity turned real. In this case, purity was built around categories: the new people, the bourgeois, were the impure, and base people, the agrarian class, were depicted as the pure. Individuals needed ‘clean’ narratives
for revolutionary purity. Clean narratives were those that showed a genuine revolutionary ideology, devoid of associations with the many enemies of the revolution. Biographies were rewritten depending on the interests of the state: some were ‘polished’ for the better (e.g. the description of Pol Pot as a worker in a rubber plantation rather than a scholar), others for worse (e.g. an extraordinary number of prisoners at S-21 were presented as members of the CIA and/or the KGB). The Manichean world of DK prized stoicism above else and killed its citizens as a work in progress to achieve a purer equality.

**Disease**

Numerous enemies threatened the survival of the regime. Traitors could be everywhere, including inside the Party centre. Enemies were described as ‘diseased’ and infrahuman, for only the ‘diseased’ could be against the pure beauty of the Kampuchean revolution. The problem for the regime was that sickness was transmitted virally, which meant, in practice, that traitors were necessarily associated through networks: one traitor, literally, must lead to another. Prisoners at S-21 were therefore forced to accuse the other ‘diseased’ elements in their ‘string’. People whose bourgeois habits had corrupted their minds would compose these strings. S-21 was central to the process of extirpation of the disease from Cambodian society, a noble mission, according to Angkar.

**Paradox of agency**

The third paradox that we extracted from the data we label as the paradox of agency. The reference is to the guards only, because the prisoners were basically captive subjects whose ‘weak point is that they are in our hands’ (p. 85). The guards, in turn, oscillated between perceptions of omnipotence and a sense of powerlessness. The paradox of their agency resided in the fact that for the guards their empowerment to interrogate and kill meant they were more visible and their visibility required that they took extra care. In this sense, the more empowered one became to interrogate and kill the less autonomous one was: all behaviour needed to be carefully scripted no matter who one was but this was especially the case for people in positions of responsibility in places such as S-21. Omnipotence and powerlessness were only two sides of the same coin.

**Omnipotence**

Feelings of omnipotence are reflected in the fact that guards were said to be sometimes out of control, exercising ‘excessive violence’ (p. 138). As far as we can interpret it, this lack of control resulted from several factors. First, from the demography of the guards and the nature of the place: ‘Isolated, bonded, terrified, yet empowered, these young men soon became horrific weapons’ (p. 138). Second, from the cruelty of S-21 and its sadistic environment: ‘Torturing prisoners might be a bonus for S-21 workers after a confession had been obtained’ (p. 135). Third, from the need of guards to please their superiors: ‘The pleasures they derived from cruelty, in some cases, enhanced their satisfaction from surviving at the prison and gaining and holding their superiors’ approval’ (p. 138).
The latter dimension highlights two crucial aspects of S-21. First, role narcissism, a dimension identified by Hinton (2005). Role narcissism helps to explain the reason why guards sometimes engaged in acts of violence that were unjustified even by the extreme standards of S-21, leading the chiefs to issue a clarification on how to use violence appropriately. Second, total dedication was required. Refusing to obey was evidence of treason. As social psychology has shown, people can adhere to assigned roles with an unexpected sense of engagement (Milgram 1974). The combination at S-21 appeared literally lethal: refusing engagement was not an option.

**Powerlessness**

Guards were aware that underneath the appearance of omnipotence they could easily become powerless in a world where obedience should go unquestioned (Cunha et al. 2010) and leadership by terror reigned, a combination that is common in totalitarian states (Kets de Vries 2004).

Ângkar required total submission. Even when guards exercised their acts of violence, they were aware that they lived under the vigilance of an organization that could easily label them as enemies. Killing an important prisoner before a ‘proper’ confession was extracted was potentially a sign of treason. A minor mistake could be viewed as treason, such that workers and guards were well aware of their positions in this organization: ‘[We] just kept smiling but [we] were tense inside’ (p. 87). Perception of one’s vulnerability to the system resulted in a generalized sense of psychological insecurity. Mistakes were heavily punished, often with death, and every deviation from the rule of Ângkar was a mistake. As we have discussed, rules changed swiftly and without warning, which means that vulnerability was permanent. S-21 and its occupants were therefore under the ever-vigilant eye of the Ângkar, and the rage of the Ângkar showed no mercy. To live in the paradoxical world of S-21 was a daily exercise in which one had to stage careful performances within the confines of accepted behaviour in a highly paranoid system.

**The organization of S-21 as state of exception**

The state of exception is, par excellence, a paradox. As Agamben stated:

One ought to reflect on the paradoxical status of the camp as space of exception: the camp is a piece of territory that is placed outside the normal juridical order; for all that, however, it is not simply an external space. (Agamben 2000, p. 39)

However, it is only by seeking within its internal and external topological structure (hence in its relational composition – Belcher et al. 2008) that we can say something about how exception takes place. Agamben’s approach proves useful, first, because it provided us with the basis to investigate the nature of the camp (as a site for the production of bare life), and second, because it enables us to show how paradoxes are central to understanding how the organization of the exception takes place (a point that, as far as we know, has not been highlighted sufficiently in the literature).

The paradox of sensemaking, the Manichean world paradox, and the paradox of agency are probably just three of the many paradoxical aspects taking place in the
S-21 extermination camp. What is interesting about them, however, is that they give us precious insight into the deeper organizational structure of S-21 itself. If its spatial organization and its rules and routines may be seen as organizational layout, the source of the exception that in the end allowed S-21 to become a terrifying machine of death is situated within the paradoxes that sustained it.

The paradox of giving sense by forbidding it; the search for purity through the extirpation of diseases, and the guard’s omnipotence, reached through complete annihilation of the others – these are all examples of sacralization, of exercising power over something, banishing it from civil life and re-capturing it through making it external to civil society. S-21 was a machine for the production and then for the extermination of homines sacri, and it was organized through a series of (conscious and unconscious) paradoxes. The organizational structure of the S-21 worked through paradoxes because the camp, by definition, is a paradox itself: this was the exceptional core of the Khmer Rouge killing machine.

Kafka and organization

The camp as paradox is conceptually hard to penetrate, hard to access, in part because inside it incomprehensible activities were routine (e.g. Scott 1987, p. 5). In this sense, as Agamben pointed out, the camp could be seen as an organization out of Kafka:

Inasmuch as the inhabitant of the camp has been severed from the political community and has been reduced to naked life […] he or she is an absolutely private person. And yet there is not one single instant in which he or she might be able to find shelter in the realm of the private, and it is precisely this indiscernibility that constitutes the specific anguish of the camp. […] Kafka was the first to describe with precision this particular type of site, with which since then we have become perfectly familiar. (Agamben 2000, p. 121, 122)

Kafka, usually thought of as referring to the condition of modern humanity in organization societies, uses an inscrutable and extreme bureaucracy to make his point in fiction. Moderns have seen a history that bears the fiction out in detail.

The Kafka metaphor is not a mere intellectual exercise. On the contrary, it allows us to re-read and open up the complexity of the S-21 as a state of exception. Moreover, the usefulness of the Kafka metaphor is the way that it conveys the meanings and rationalities of S-21 in a less philosophical, but still relevant, fashion. Kafka provides an implicit handbook for organized tyranny in his literary work (Warner 2007). It is not bureaucracy that initiates the terror, but inexplicable and unknown forces. In his fiction, once the bureaucratic apparatus has been alerted, its procedures form a trap based on a premise of guilt that corrodes the soul of the person inserted into the bureaucratic procedures. Such a person begins to think that (s)he must be guilty of something. In fact many people became caught up in the process through the desperate attempts of others to tell their interrogators what they thought that they wanted to hear. In this way, serial denunciation of ‘strings of traitors’ could be created – a process that is quite normal in Kafkaesque organizations. Consider the opening of The Trial (Kafka 1999a): ‘Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph K., (for without having done anything wrong, he was arrested one fine morning)’. Collins (1974) pointed out the Kafkaesque nature of the Nazi
extermination process. We see S-21 as another expression of this type of organization – prefigured in fiction but exceeded in reality.

Another Kafkaesque dimension is the need strictly to follow rules that one does not understand, something common to most bureaucracies in which subordinates are expected to obey, not to understand (Jacques 1996, Clegg et al. 2006). The paradoxes outlined before are, in this sense, truly out of Kafka. For instance, sensemaking is even more unlikely when unquestioning obedience can be complemented with a frequent change of rules – as K, the protagonist in The Castle, noted: each time he tried to understand what was expected from him as Land Surveyor, new rules had been established (Kafka 1999b). The same occurs in the case of the penal colony described in another of Kafka’s story (Kafka 1919; see also Rhodes and Kornberger 2009), where ‘no one knows what the law is in the Colony; least of all “the condemned”, even “as they inflict torture on him”’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, p. 43).

**The biopolitics of a Kafkaesque bureaucracy**

While it might be thought that Agamben (2000) adds little to Foucault’s account of biopower, this would be mistaken. Biopower, for Foucault, is a phenomenon only of the modern state and its arithmetic. For Agamben, the possibilities of the power of classification to dehumanize do not depend on modernity because the basic binary of the homines sacri and the zoe stretch from antiquity. Moreover, Democratic Kampuchea was hardly a modern state and the biopower on offer was only indirectly targeted at the entire population (through fear and terror): while almost anyone could end up in the camps, not everyone did and there was no state arithmetic acting as a measure to divide classes of subject a priori: the accounting occurred after enclosure in the camp rather than rationally, on a population basis, by sophisticated discriminations beforehand.

The project of the Khmer Rouge could be described, just as could that of the Jacobins, as one in which political thought was committed to the total reconstruction of social, political and economic forms outside of established or embedded cultural formations. In order to generate the social and political energy necessary to effect revolutionary change, flaws must be rectified, rottenness cured by excision, deviants smashed, creating paradox. The creation of paradoxes was pursued, both consciously and unconsciously, through forms of biopolitical power. In this sense S21 is not only a governmental technique, in terms of the way the Khmer achieved the ‘right disposition of things’ (Foucault 2000, p. 208); rather, the paradoxes through which the Khmer organized were biopolitical for at least two reasons. First, because they kept control of the bios, retrieving, or inventing, the ‘aleatory events that occur within a population that exists over a period of time’ (Foucault 2000, p. 246). And second, because they were sustained by a ‘logic of formation which takes hold when power takes species life as its referent object, and the securing of species life becomes the vocation of a novel and emerging set of discursive formation of power/knowledge’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, p. 267). The Khmers sought a systematic organization to reform deviance, using a paradoxical construction of polarities constituted with the aim of deleting inmates’ bios while controlling and exterminating inmates’ zoe as well.

S-21 was a ‘Kafkaesque bureaucracy’, a kind of exceptional bureaucracy that engaged its members with paradoxes that they could not tackle. Urged to follow an
ideological rulebook, reality kept shifting the categories. Everyday life inside the organization mounted obstacles to sensemaking using the stable categories of ideology. The signifiers could ‘float’ quite easily from terrorizer to terrorized; members could be empowered but also dis-empowered if the empowerment did not work to the institution’s benefit.

Conclusion

The Kafkaesque organization creates the biopolitical mechanisms and the counter-mechanisms necessary to keep it ‘pure’. The paper showed how S-21 was one such organization, a true state of exception organized through a series of paradoxes. First, it needed to protect the Khmer Rouge vision of the world. It did so by combining sensegiving from the top with senseblocking to prevent alternative sensemaking possibilities. Second, it created mechanisms that protected its vision by instantly turning friends into foes in a process that maintained the flow of the pure and the impure. Third, it empowered and disempowered at will, in a curious but not necessarily rare interpretation of empowerment. Conviction and passion are the tools leaders need to create these strangely empowered organizations.

Yeats (1920) might have said that the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity; we would want to change this formula. The worst is represented by the fusion of all conviction and passionate intensity with an organizational biopolitical apparatus dedicated to processing paranoia and delivering its judgments. It is this that produces a total institution as a moral apparatus dedicated to social cleansing of whatever ‘deviance’ is at issue. S-21 is an exemplar of the Kafkaesque extreme total institution. It confronts its members with puzzles they are not allowed to tackle, with riddles with no solution, with political games of life and death, with ever-shifting rules.

Confront people with paradoxes wrapped in paradoxes, and they will feel like K. Missionary zeal inflamed by a clear vision, legitimizing myths, leadership cocoons and a culture of competition/aggression that breeds paranoia characterizes not only recent Asian history but rather more contemporaneous and Western histories, including some recent histories of confinement and torture shaped by the institutions that we sometimes call Kafkaesque or that we sometimes refer to as ‘states of exception’, such as Guantanamo Bay or the Detention Camps in which Australian political authorities intern Asylum seekers. Camps do not so much keep out deviants as produce them: they divide biopolitics into a world of purity and impurity, dwellers in realms whose borders are to be kept pure and those thought to be a real or imagined threat against the freedoms enjoyed within these borders, incarcerated.

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Notes

1. Of course, in the broader social science literature, the work of scholars such as Bauman (1989) and Arendt (1968) is well known. In one of those effects of professionalization and disciplinization, however, the literature of organization studies (defined as the contributions to journals such as *Organization Science, Organization Studies, Organization*
and Administrative Science Quarterly) has been very largely disengaged from accounts of the Holocaust and other genocidal situations. There are exceptions, such as Grey (2005), which explicitly engage with the Holocaust, as well as Madsen and Willert (1996), du Gay (2000), Armbruster and Gebert (2002), and Ten Bos (2007), and more recently, the important work of Stokes and Gabriel (2010) and the unpublished work of Ek et al. (2007), as well as Clegg (2009). The point remains though: study of genocidal organization is not considered a major part of organization studies.

2. The influence of French Marxism on the Khmer Rouge is often mentioned as decisive, although Short (2004) gives short shrift to this idea. Pol Pot was simply too minor a figure and too un-intellectual to be much involved in the labyrinthine politics of the French left (see Badiou 2008). Anyway, most of what occurred in French Marxist circles, such as those the Cambodian nationalists moved in, would best be thought of as dogma rather than theory (Majumdar 1998), despite pretensions. Short sees the ideological influences as far more local and home-grown.

3. To analyse the data, we read the book twice, the first time without any coding attempts, the second for coding purposes. After that, we often returned to the book to check for evidence and meaning. We tried to limit codes to descriptions of S-21 as an organization rather than about other contents of the book, such as chronologies, biographies, political contextualization and so forth. Our intention was to study the nature of this organization, described as Kafkaesque. As such, all the elements that were not descriptive of the organization were not considered. We coded a total of 76 initial entries that were reduced to 20 first-order codes. These codes provide direct descriptions of S-21 as an organization. They offer relevant information leading us to extract second-order themes from constant comparison (Glaser and Strauss 1967), an attempt to make sense of the data at a higher level of theoretical abstraction. The attempt to extract theoretical meaning from comparing codes and aggregating them at a higher level resulted in six second-order themes related in three opposing pairs: sensegiving and senseblocking, purity and disease, omnipotence and powerlessness. These pairs were already a result of the comparison between categories and the text, and of interpretation, with successive readings of the first-order codes making these tensions apparent. In the third stage, we related the tensions emerging from the data into three paradoxes. The first, the sensemaking paradox, collapses two themes: sensegiving and senseblocking. The second, the Manichean world paradox, articulates the tension between a world where purity and disease were viewed as opposing but shifting categories. The third sets in tension the interplay between omnipotence and powerlessness. These three dimensions constitute overarching concepts that provide a theoretically deeper analysis of organizing forces at play in S-21. Semiotic clustering reduces a very complex organization to a number of deep structural characteristics that help to increase abstraction and to gain analytical sophistication.

4. These were derived from second-order themes, which in turn resulted from the first-order concepts that were directly taken from the source. For the sake of theoretical elegance, we assumed that overlaps could be rendered acceptable through the clarification of the meaning of the final categories.

5. The originator of the term ‘sensemaking’ always renders it as a single rather than hyphenated compound (Weick 1993). We shall follow his lead in this and in coining other ‘sense’ based neologisms.

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